Defending People

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A Lie Told Often Enough…

Return­ing to the topic of the Enliven Project rape info­graphic:

Two Per­cent?

Sarah Beaulieu, try­ing to jus­tify the info­graphic, assumes that only 2% of rape reports are false. This is, as it turns out, not only her asser­tion; it is also a meme.

Edward Greer of Brook­line Mass­a­chu­setts did some detec­tive work to try to track down the meme’s Patient Zero. In an arti­cle (PDF, via dinky_hawker on red­dit) pub­lished at 33 Loy­ola of Los Ange­les Law Review 947 (2000) Greer tracks the per­cent­age (which is by “over­whelm­ing con­sen­sus” rec­og­nized to be “empir­i­cal fact”) back to “an illu­sion that sprang from a mimeoed hand­out in Susan Brownmiller’s file.” Brownmiller’s asser­tion that no more than 2% of reported rapes are false is based entirely on the remarks of a judge, New York Appel­late Divi­sion Jus­tice Lawrence H. Cooke, “Before the Asso­ci­a­tion of the Bar of the City of New York, Jan. 16, 1974.”

Every “scholar” for the last thirty-eight years who has asserted that only 2% of rape reports are false bases this asser­tion on com­ment a judge made in a speech to some lawyers. These schol­ars cite to each other, but in the end nobody has any other basis for the asser­tion than Judge Cooke’s comment.

Twenty-Five Per­cent?

(This is for that guy at red­dit who thinks that say­ing, “I’ve got a bias, so con­sider your own expe­ri­ence”  is less awe­some than try­ing to prove it to him.)

In my orig­i­nal post I men­tioned the num­ber “close to 25%”—the exclu­sion rate in cases sub­mit­ted to DNA lab­o­ra­to­ries. Max Ken­nerly took me to task in com­ments for not pro­vid­ing a bet­ter cita­tion for what I describe as “a cred­i­ble rea­son to assume” that the frac­tion of rape alle­ga­tions that are false is greater than two percent.

Max, “A cred­i­ble rea­son to assume” is aux­etic. But, just for you, here’s a source: Con­victed by Juries, Exon­er­ated by Sci­ence, US Depart­ment of Jus­tice Office of Jus­tice Pro­grams 1996 (at page 20):

In about 23 per­cent of the 21,621 cases, DNA test results excluded sus­pects, accord­ing to respondents.

Twenty-three per­cent of DNA tests exclud­ing sus­pects does not mean that 23% of rape alle­ga­tions are false. Many rape alle­ga­tions don’t involve testable DNA; in those that do, sus­pects may be devel­oped by other means than the com­plainants’ accu­sa­tion. If a woman is raped and says “I don’t know who did it” and the police develop a sus­pect and that sus­pect is excluded by DNA test­ing, that’s not a false allegation.

So I’m not sure that the 23% exclu­sion rate really says any­thing about how many rape alle­ga­tions are false. But you can cer­tainly use it as a cred­i­ble basis to assume. Aux­e­sis.

Forty-One Per­cent?

There have in fact been stud­ies done of the per­cent­age of rape alle­ga­tions that are false.

Here are the para­me­ters of one US study, pub­lished in the peer-reviewed Archives of Sex­ual Behav­ior:

  • 109 forcible rape allegations.
  • Over 9 years (1978−1987).
  • In a mid­west­ern town of 70,000.
  • Inves­ti­ga­tion of all rape com­plaints involved a seri­ous offer to poly­graph the com­plainants and the suspects.
  • False alle­ga­tion” means that the com­plainant recanted.
  • The police agency charged recant­ing com­plainants with fil­ing a false complaint.

Here are some of the findings:

  • Forty-five of the 109 com­plainants (41%) recanted, and did not then try to retract their recan­ta­tions when they were told they would be pros­e­cuted for fil­ing a false complaint.
  • Twenty-seven of the forty-five had made false alle­ga­tions “to pro­vide a plau­si­ble expla­na­tion for some sud­denly fore­seen, unfor­tu­nate con­se­quence of a con­sen­sual encounter, usu­ally sex­ual, with a male acquain­tance.” (I referred to this most com­mon moti­va­tion in my first post on the topic; 
  • Twelve of the forty-five had made false alle­ga­tions to retal­i­ate against a reject­ing male.
  • Eight of the forty-five had made false alle­ga­tions to get atten­tion or sympathy.
  • (Motives were deter­mined based on the com­plainants’ own words; bvi­ously, there is some over­lap among motives.)
(Kanin, False Rape Alle­ga­tions, 23 Archives of Sex­ual Behav­ior 81 (1994) (PDF)).

Kanin’s data are poo-pooed in an arti­cle (PDF) from a mag­a­zine pub­lished by the Amer­i­can Pros­e­cu­tors Research Institute’s National Cen­ter for the Pros­e­cu­tion of Vio­lence Against Women (bias alert!)—the arti­cle on which Beaulieu bases her 2% assumption:

In other words, there is no way to explore whether the clas­si­fi­ca­tion of these cases as false was sim­ply made as a result of the detec­tives’ own per­cep­tions and biases, with­out any real inves­ti­ga­tion being conducted.This con­cern is com­pounded by the fact that the prac­tice of this par­tic­u­lar police depart­ment was to make a “seri­ous offer to poly­graph” all rape com­plainants and sus– pects (Kanin, 1994, p. 82). In fact, this prac­tice “has been rejected and, in many cases, out­lawed because of its intim­i­dat­ing impact on vic­tims” (Lisak, 2007, p. 6).The rea­son is because many vic­tims will recant when faced with appar­ent skep­ti­cism on the part of the inves­ti­ga­tor and the intim­i­dat­ing prospect of hav­ing to take a poly­graph examination.Yet such a recan­ta­tion does not nec­es­sar­ily mean that the orig­i­nal report was false.

In real­ity, there is no way that an inves­tiga– tor can make an appro­pri­ate deter­mi­na­tion about the legit­i­macy of a sex­ual assault report when no real inves­ti­ga­tion has been conducted—and the vic­tim is intim­i­dated by the department’s pol­icy of mak­ing a “seri­ous offer to poly­graph” all rape com­plainants. As we will dis­cuss at length below, the deter­mi­na­tion that a report is false can only be made on the basis of find­ings from a thor­ough, evidence-based investigation.

The pros­e­cu­tors’ arti­cle then goes on to talk about “the MAD study,” which clas­si­fied seven per­cent of rape reports as false (two of the three authors of the study are direc­tors of EVAW inter­na­tional, which con­ducted the study; there seems to be no ref­er­ence to pub­lished, much less peer-reviewed results of the MAD study.

Peo­ple with an agenda can not only pick and choose the sta­tis­tics they use to make their argu­ments and info graph­ics, but also design their stud­ies to get results closer to their ide­ol­ogy. That is one rea­son that (peer-reviewed and pub­lished) > not (peer-reviewed and published).

Ide­ol­ogy

I’ll lay my ide­ol­ogy on the table. I am a criminal-defense lawyer with a mother, a father, a brother, a wife, a daugh­ter, and a son.

I believe that rapists should be reported and pros­e­cuted (I ben­e­fit from it not only as a mem­ber of soci­ety, but also as a pro­fes­sional in the busi­ness of defend­ing against rape allegations).

I also believe that false rape alle­ga­tions should never be made (I ben­e­fit from false rape alle­ga­tions, because they need to be defended against as well, but this (like the War on Drugs) is one of those instances in which I will work against my own self-interest).

One” would be an unac­cept­ably high num­ber either of false rape alle­ga­tions or of vic­tims not report­ing their rapes. I would no more want one of the men in my fam­ily to be falsely accused of rape than I would want one of the women in my fam­ily to be raped. I don’t know how we can, as a soci­ety, reduce the num­ber of unre­ported rapes with­out increas­ing the num­ber of false reports.

I try not to let my ide­ol­ogy affect my pre­sen­ta­tion of facts here. (That’s what the court­room is for.) “Two per­cent” is a num­ber based entirely in ide­ol­ogy. Greer, in his arti­cle, dis­cusses the ide­ol­ogy behind “two percent”:

LDF lit­er­a­ture advances the propo­si­tion that “women don’t lie about rape” as an axiomatic sub­strate to their pro­posed pol­icy changes fueled by the pur­ported two per­cent false claim fig­ure. As fur­ther jus­ti­fi­ca­tion, LDF pro­claims that women are deterred from mak­ing false rape charges because, inter alia, rape com­plainants are sub­jected to a har­row­ing “sec­ond rape.” Simul­ta­ne­ously, LDF wants alter­ations in the pro­cess­ing of rape charges by reduc­ing the sanc­tions, costs and trauma—i.e., the “sec­ond rape”—that face women who come for­ward and press rape charges.

Mak­ing it eas­ier to press rape charges, Greer points out, makes it eas­ier to press false rape charges. Can we solve one prob­lem with­out exac­er­bat­ing the other? I don’t know the answer, but I know it won’t be found in lies.

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About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

Comments

12 Responses to “A Lie Told Often Enough…”

  1. Max Kennerly says:

    Thanks for address­ing my com­ment. I wouldn’t say I “took you to task” (I usu­ally con­sider that an alle­ga­tion of bad faith), I was just point­ing out it was merely the com­men­tary of a DA some­where, and wasn’t backed up by any­thing else.

    The cite you have now is com­men­tary by Barry Scheck assert­ing, also with­out cita­tion, “FBI offi­cials report” those num­bers. Like with the DA, maybe he’s right — I respect Barry Scheck’s work immensely — but maybe this is some silly myth that’s being passed around on one ide­o­log­i­cal side, like how you describe the 2% num­ber. He doesn’t claim he actu­ally saw and reviewed the data, he just drops the fig­ure in there and expects no one to ask ques­tions. It wouldn’t be sur­pris­ing if each side has their own “facts” nobody can source.

    It really shouldn’t be that hard for some­one to track down the source of these sup­posed FBI num­bers. I don’t mean that per­son should be you, but, well, if we’re hav­ing this big debate on the inter­net about empir­i­cal data, we should have the actual empir­i­cal data at hand or admit that we don’t have it.

    • Max Kennerly says:

      You know what, scratch that — I see where Barry Scheck got that num­ber, from lower in the report. Shows me for search­ing for the phrase only once. (Why his com­men­tary pre­cedes the data beats me.)

      Mea culpa. Lemme read that report.

    • Max Kennerly says:

      One more then I’m done: later in the study, it ref­er­ences a tele­phone sur­vey of DNA labs about DNA evi­dence in gen­eral, and that’s what you quote. That sur­vey does not seem to be lim­ited to sex­ual assault cases, so I still have no idea where Scheck got that num­ber from. Either he made an assump­tion or the sur­vey wasn’t described cor­rectly in the DOJ report.

      Then there’s the prob­lem of what it means to “exclude a sus­pect,” as you discuss.

      Any­way, my point in gen­eral remains that this issue is rarely dis­cussed with much ref­er­ence to empir­i­cal data. Usu­ally, if some­one cites some­thing at all, it’s just one cite and then we’re off to the races to the con­clu­sion. The Kanin study is inter­est­ing, but it’s also a nar­row study; I don’t see why that can’t be repeated many times, to cre­ate a much larger dataset. Maybe it has been.

      At the end of all of this is the ques­tion you raise of: what pol­icy should we change? I frankly can’t think of much to change other than to encour­age pros­e­cu­tors to do a thor­ough and fair review of every case. But we all know that.

      • Mark Bennett says:

        Hmm. Inter­est­ing. It looks like Scheck is refer­ring to other data than the NIJ’s infor­mal sur­vey, which car­ries this caveat:

        Unfor­tu­nately, the lab­o­ra­to­ries were unable to pro­vide more details. They did not main­tain data bases that would per­mit cat­e­go­riza­tion of DNA test results by type of offense and other cri­te­ria. What hap­pened to the sus­pects who were excluded through DNA test­ing also can­not be deter­mined. Were they released, or were they charged on the basis of other evi­dence, for example?

        Do you have time for a home­work assignment?

        • Max Kennerly says:

          Oof. I wish. I did find this:

          http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2092195

          Note this conclusion:

          The causes of false con­vic­tions vary greatly by crime. For homi­cides, which account for nearly half of all exon­er­a­tions in the study, the lead­ing cause of error was per­jury and other false accu­sa­tions – usu­ally delib­er­ate false iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of the defen­dant as the crim­i­nal. Homi­cide exon­er­a­tions also include a high rate of offi­cial mis­con­duct and three-quarters of all false con­fes­sions in the study. For adult sex­ual assault cases, and for the much smaller num­ber of rob­bery exon­er­a­tions, the lead­ing cause of error was mis­taken wit­ness iden­ti­fi­ca­tions. Sex­ual assault exon­er­a­tions also include a large num­ber of cases with false or mis­lead­ing foren­sic evidence.”

  2. This was one of the best crim­i­nal defense posts I have read in a long time. I have a rape case com­ing up where the defense is false accu­sa­tion to cover up a con­sen­sual encounter where they were caught in the act. The post gave me a lot of ideas to dis­cuss dur­ing jury selec­tion, thanks.

  3. Sylvia Russell says:

    This is inter­est­ing, but I think that the amount of false alle­ga­tions prob­a­bly has changed over the past 20 years. And, more specif­i­cally, I’m going to guess that it’s been sig­nif­i­cantly reduced. There’s been a lot of change regard­ing accep­tance of female sex­u­al­ity, so while women may regret sleep­ing with a man, there isn’t as much soci­etal pressure(though it still exists) that women should be ashamed of it, and thus less pres­sure to renounce a con­sen­sual sex­ual act.

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