Defending People

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David Martin, Willingham’s Trial Lawyer, Speaks Up (Updated With New Links)

Cameron Todd Willingham’s trial lawyer, David Mar­tin, on Ander­son Cooper yesterday.

Awfully defen­sive for a guy who thinks he is right. Repeated highlights:

  • You pour lighter fluid on a car­pet and set it on fire, it looks just like those pic­tures.” (We’re not much on the sci­en­tific method here in Texas.)
  • I have been a trial lawyer for 25 years.” (Mean­ing that in 1992 he’d been a trial lawyer for only eight years.)
  • That’s absurd.” (Repeated fre­quently enough that it must be absurd.)

Texas Mora­to­rium Net­work, who sent me the link, asked (rea­son­ably):

Is there any Texas Bar eth­i­cal rule that should con­strain lawyers from argu­ing for their for­mer now-dead client’s guilt, like attorney-client priv­i­lege or fidu­ciary respon­si­bil­ity, even after the for­mer client is dead. Maybe that would be an inter­est­ing topic for a blog post, Mar­tin seem­ingly vio­lat­ing the trust put into him by his for­mer client. If a per­son can not trust that his lawyer will not turn on him and start advo­cat­ing for his guilt, then how can a per­son trust the lawyer enough to speak openly with him. I would be inter­ested in read­ing what lawyers think are their eth­i­cal oblig­a­tions to for­mer clients.

My posi­tion is that a) all facts the lawyer learns in the course of rep­re­sen­ta­tion are priv­i­leged; and b) this priv­i­lege sur­vives the end of rep­re­sen­ta­tion and the client’s death. So, for exam­ple, the fact that the defense team did its own pseu­do­sci­en­tific exper­i­ment would be priv­i­leged and not some­thing that the ex-lawyer would be free to reveal (with­out the client’s permission).

As we say in the crim­i­nal cour­t­house, so much for the facts.

How about the ex-lawyer’s thoughts and con­clu­sions (if they can be revealed with­out reveal­ing facts)? If the lawyer says, while lit­i­ga­tion is pend­ing, “I think my client was guilty” is he vio­lat­ing some dis­ci­pli­nary rule? The DRs don’t include an explicit client loy­alty pro­vi­sion, but this may be one of those sit­u­a­tions in which ethics trump the rules.

If the lawyer says, after lit­i­ga­tion is over, “I think my client was guilty” (again, with­out reveal­ing facts), like­wise, I don’t think he’s vio­lat­ing any dis­ci­pli­nary rule.

You don’t see Waco’s excel­lent crim­i­nal appel­late lawyer Wal­ter Reaves, who rep­re­sented Will­ing­ham on appeal, shoot­ing his mouth off on CNN. I’ve got to won­der why Mar­tin would want to go on TV to run down his client. Not to defend his own honor—there is, as far as I know, no sug­ges­tion that he was inef­fec­tive in Willingham’s trial. Maybe just for the pub­lic­ity? Or to help out his fel­low rancher Rick Perry?

As a criminal-defense lawyer who has had more than his 15 min­utes of fame and has spent much of this week try­ing to keep his face (and his clients’) off the tele­vi­sion screen, I’m left scratch­ing my head.

Update: Preach­ing to the Choir, Chan­dler, Ari­zona criminal-defense lawyer Matt Brown, New York criminal-defense lawyer Scott Green­field, Ohio criminal-defense lawyer Jeff Gamso, Texas Mora­to­rium Net­work, and Willingham’s appel­late coun­sel, Waco criminal-defense lawyer Wal­ter Reaves (link to front page—permalink is bro­ken) him­self check in.

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About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

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14 Responses to “David Martin, Willingham’s Trial Lawyer, Speaks Up (Updated With New Links)”

  1. Jeff Gamso says:

    There are plenty of lawyers who rel­ish the cam­eras. The real ques­tion is what you say when they’re on.
    It’s been a long time since I’ve prac­ticed in Texas, so I’ll take your word for what’s in the DRs there about any con­tin­u­ing duty to the client. But most (if not all) states pro­vide that the lawyer has a con­tin­u­ing duty of loy­alty to the for­mer client — at least in regard to the mat­ters of for­mer rep­re­sen­ta­tion. ABA Stan­dard for Crim­i­nal Jus­tice 4–3.5(d) sets out a gen­eral prin­ci­ple of con­tin­ued loyalty:

    Defense coun­sel who has for­merly rep­re­sented a defen­dant should not there­after use infor­ma­tion related to the for­mer rep­re­sen­ta­tion to the dis­ad­van­tage of the for­mer client unless the infor­ma­tion has become gen­er­ally known or the eth­i­cal oblig­a­tion of con­fi­den­tial­ity oth­er­wise does not apply.”

    I don’t see any way that what Mar­tin said doesn’t vio­late that prin­ci­ple. Will­ing­ham has some chance of exon­er­a­tion from a hor­ri­ble crime. He may not be alive to per­son­ally enjoy the ben­e­fit of that exon­er­a­tion, but his rep­u­ta­tion cer­tainly will should it hap­pen. That chance, and there­fore Will­ing­ham, is directly dis­ad­van­taged by what Mar­tin said. I think it’s flat out unethical.

    And as the Vince Fos­ter case (Swi­dler & Berlin v. US) says, part of the rea­son priv­i­lege extends beyond death is that clients have inter­ests that extend beyond their death. This is a prime example.

  2. John Lentini says:

    Mr. Martin’s state­ment about con­duct­ing an exper­i­ment with lighter fluid and get­ting the exact same kind of pat­terns that he saw in the Will­ing­ham res­i­dence actu­ally proves the point of the fire sci­en­tists who have researched the devel­op­ment of fire pat­terns in fully involved compartments.

    While it is true that you can make a pat­tern with an indictable liq­uid in the open, you can make that same pat­tern with­out an indictable liq­uid inside a com­part­ment. Pat­terns pro­duced dur­ing full room involve­ment can look exactly like pat­terns pro­duced by an indictable liq­uid, and care must be taken in their inter­pre­ta­tion. In fact, if the lab­o­ra­tory report comes back neg­a­tive, the pat­tern should be attrib­uted to the radi­a­tion that accom­pa­nies full room involvement.

    • Mark Bennett says:

      In response to your first paragraph:

      That lighter fluid and car­pet cre­ates those pat­terns proves only that lighter fluid and car­pet in fires in the open cre­ate those patterns.

      Your say­ing that it proves that other things burn­ing inside a com­part­ment make the same pat­terns is just as unsci­en­tific as Martin’s imply­ing that it proves that only lighter fluid cre­ates such pat­terns. Maybe more so. Mar­tin sees a white swan, and con­cludes that all swans are white. You see a white swan as proof that black swans exist.

      • Mark,

        I think you are miss­ing Mr. Lentini’s points. What he is say­ing here is what he and other arson experts have been say­ing for quite some time now. One can­not tell any­thing about so-called pour pat­terns by visual inspec­tion because flashover can pro­duce some­thing that looks as if accel­er­ant were used. I think Mr. Lentini knows inde­pen­dently that black swans exist, and so is cor­rect­ing Mr. Mar­tin, who thinks that they do not.

        • Mark Bennett says:

          I got that; it’s actu­ally what I said (much more ele­gantly) with my two ref­er­ences to the sci­ence of Martin’s “experiment”.

          No, what I take excep­tion to is the first para­graph of Mr. Lentini’s com­ment, in which he sug­gests that Martin’s “exper­i­ment” proves some point. I should have said that. Oh, wait. I did.

          No good comes from try­ing to grind an already sharp ax.

  3. […] Jeff Gamso per­haps sums up best: It’s been a long time since I’ve prac­ticed in Texas, so I’ll take your word for […]

  4. […] video mostly speaks for itself, but you can read some great blog posts about it here, here, here, and here. Willingham’s appel­late lawyer even wrote about it here (the link is to the […]

  5. Mike Trent says:

    Mark, why do you believe the attorney-client priv­i­lege in a crim­i­nal case per­sists after death? In a crim­i­nal case, I’m won­der­ing what pos­si­ble inter­est the client would have after death. is there a basis for your opinion?

  6. Tim Burton says:

    If you read the Will­ing­ham trial tran­scripts, it seems obvi­ous that Mar­tin did a hor­ri­ble job as defense attorney.

    His biggest error was not find­ing an arson expert who would have dis­puted the state’s case. There were plenty around. Ger­ald Hurst, who wrote the 2004 report on the Will­ing­ham fire, lived in Texas and had been con­sult­ing on arson cases since 1972.

    Mar­tin also failed to use the 1992 edi­tion of Guide for Fire and Explo­sion Inves­ti­ga­tions, the stan­dard man­ual for sci­en­tific arson inves­ti­ga­tion, to vig­or­ously attack the meth­ods and con­clu­sions of the arson investigators.

    Mar­tin also failed to point out how many of the neigh­bors and other wit­nesses to Willingham’s behav­ior dur­ing and after the fire changed their tes­ti­mony from the orig­i­nal police state­ments to make it incrim­i­nate Will­ing­ham at trial.

    Mar­tin failed to men­tion in the clos­ing argu­ments that Will­ing­ham loved his klds and had no motive to kill them. He should have held up a photo(s) of Will­ing­ham play­ing with one or more of his chil­dren. He also wasted a lot of time talk­ing the Bible.

    Mar­tin bought in to the prosecutor’s the­ory that accel­er­ant had been spread through­out the house, and came up with a bizarre alter­na­tive the­ory that the 2-year old spread oil from an oil lamp and then was play­ing with a lighter or matches and started the fire. That was stupid.

    A much more rea­son­able the­ory was that the 2 year old dropped some­thing close to the space heater, such as a blan­ket, and acci­den­tally started the fire. The mother remem­bers the healer being on, and it was Dec. 23. Mar­tin could have checked the weather report to see how cold it was.

    Mar­tin only called 2 wit­nesses for the defense, and the tes­ti­mony of one of those was thrown out as hearsay. That was an inad­e­quate defense.

  7. […] Cooper to dis­cuss the Will­ing­ham case. Mark Ben­nett, of the blog Defend­ing Peo­ple, dis­cusses the ethics of this, and the Texas client con­fi­den­tial­ity rules gen­er­ally. Other attor­neys dis­cuss Martin’s […]

  8. Scott Fenney says:

    I see why Mar­tin argues his client is guilty, oth­er­wise he has to come to terms with how utterly incom­pe­tent his rep­re­sen­ta­tion was and how that may have resulted in an inno­cent man’s death. The Front­line show demon­strates to any­one that has seen it that not only is there rea­son­able doubt, but there is mas­sive doubt. Will­ing­ham may have been guilty, but for the jury to only delib­er­ate for an hour and be sure “beyond a rea­son­able doubt,” shows an aston­ish­ing lack abil­ity on Martin’s part to raise any of a half dozen ques­tions that should have a least slowed the jury down to more than an hour of delib­er­a­tions. Mar­tin should be ashamed.

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