Defending People

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Boucher Revisited

If I read The Volokh Con­spir­acy, I would’ve seen and (again) blogged about this back in February:

U.S. Dis­trict Judge William K. Ses­sions III in Burling­ton handed down an opin­ion sort-of-reversing Mag­is­trate Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier’s order quash­ing a grand jury sub­poena for:

all doc­u­ments, whether in elec­tronic or paper form, reflect­ing any pass­words used or asso­ci­ated with the Alien­ware Note­book Com­puter .… seized from Sebastien Boucher at the Port of Entry at Derby Line, Ver­mont on Decem­ber 17, 2006.

I say “sort-of-reversing” because between Judge Niedermeier’s order and Judge Sessions’s opin­ion, the Gov­ern­ment decided that it wanted Boucher “to pro­duce the con­tents of his encrypted hard drive in an unen­crypted for­mat by open­ing the drive before the grand jury”, rather than pro­duce any doc­u­ment reflect­ing a pass­word (Ses­sions Opin­ion p. 1).

I won­dered when I read Mag­is­trate Judge Niedermeier’s opin­ion in 2007 why Mr. Boucher was oppos­ing the sub­poena: he shouldn’t have had any doc­u­ments respon­sive to the sub­poena; his pass­word should have been either entirely in his mind or entirely for­got­ten. If the sub­poena asked for some­thing that didn’t exist, the bet­ter course, it seemed to me, would have been to tell the Gov­ern­ment that no such doc­u­ments existed. It’s not the accused’s job to tell the Gov­ern­ment that it’s ask­ing for the wrong thing.

Now the Gov­ern­ment is ask­ing for the right thing (for Mr. Boucher “to pro­duce the con­tents of his encrypted hard drive in an unen­crypted for­mat by open­ing the drive before the grand jury”) but Judge Sessions’s analy­sis seems lacking.

Judge Ses­sions, in his opin­ion, talks in terms of “pro­duc­ing an unen­crypted ver­sion of the Z drive”:

Because Boucher has no act of pro­duc­tion priv­i­lege to refuse to pro­vide the grand jury with an unen­crypted ver­sion of the Z drive of his com­puter, his motion to quash the sub­poena (as mod­i­fied by the Gov­ern­ment) is denied.

His analy­sis relied heav­ily on In re Grand Jury Sub­poena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992 (United States v. Doe), 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993), which involved a sub­poena requir­ing the pro­duc­tion of the orig­i­nal of a suspect’s cal­en­dar, where the Gov­ern­ment already had a photocopy.

That analy­sis would be cor­rect (or at least closer to cor­rect) if Mr. Boucher had in his pos­ses­sion an unen­crypted ver­sion of the Z drive. We could take the first part of the Government’s request, and require Mr. Boucher to sat­isfy it by pro­duc­ing the unen­crypted drive in his pos­ses­sion. But we can safely assume that he does not have such an unen­crypted drive.

So any analy­sis should include the sec­ond part of the request: “by open­ing the drive before the grand jury.” This takes the sub­poena out of the ter­ri­tory cov­ered by In re Grand Jury Sub­poena. An unen­crypted ver­sion of the Z drive can­not be pro­duced by Mr. Boucher because it does not exist. The files that the Gov­ern­ment claims are ille­gal do not cur­rently exist. The gov­ern­ment would like Mr. Boucher to cre­ate (or recre­ate) an unen­crypted ver­sion of the Z drive, and files con­tain­ing images that it claims are ille­gal, by enter­ing his pass­word into a com­puter. Enter­ing the pass­word is a small act, but in effect it’s as if the Gov­ern­ment in In re Grand Jury Sub­poena had lost the pho­to­copy of the diary and asked the wit­ness to hand­write a dupli­cate from memory.

Sure, there are cases in which a grand jury can require some­one to cre­ate some­thing that doesn’t exist, but enter­ing a pri­vate pass­word into a com­puter is a far cry from giv­ing a hand­writ­ing exemplar.

Law is metaphor. When we argue by anal­ogy, we choose a metaphor; when we dis­tin­guish pre­vi­ous cases, we chal­lenge the metaphor. In a novel case, the choice of metaphor can con­trol the result. In Mr. Boucher’s case, a bet­ter metaphor than “the orig­i­nal of the doc­u­ment” for what the gov­ern­ment sought is “the com­bi­na­tion to an uncrack­able safe”; maybe even “the receiver for an auto­matic weapon” or “waiver of attorney-client privilege”.

The sky is not falling—the Boucher case rests on nar­row facts, and the result might have been the same if Judge Ses­sions had cho­sen a dif­fer­ent metaphor—but the Government’s choice of metaphor here dic­tated the result.

I have prac­ticed before Judge Ses­sions. I have no doubt that he’s extremely sharp, and he struck me as emi­nently fair. So maybe there’s some­thing I’m miss­ing, some rea­son, elided by Judge Ses­sions, that “the orig­i­nal of the diary” is the only metaphor that makes any sense. What do you say? Gamso? Kaiser? Tan­nebaum? Green­field? Any­one?

(Boucher appealed Judge Sessions’s rul­ing to the Sec­ond Cir­cuit Court of Appeals, but then moved for dis­missal of his own appeal.)

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About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

Comments

8 Responses to “Boucher Revisited”

  1. shg says:

    Seems like my Decon­struct­ing Boucher post of Jan­u­ary, 2008, dis­cussing the act of pro­duc­tion priv­i­lege, pretty much answered the ques­tion. As I tell my wife daily, I’m not as dumb as I look.

    • Mark Bennett says:

      No, not really. You seemed happy with the “com­bi­na­tion to a safe” metaphor when Judge Nei­der­meier used it. Are you happy with the “orig­i­nal of a diary” metaphor now? Is In re Grand Jury Sub­poena Duces Tecum really per­sua­sive author­ity to you? Why?

      For the search-impaired: Scott’s decon­struc­tion­ist post.

      • shg says:

        I don’t like the “orig­i­nal of a diary” any more than you do, and as much as I enjoy a good metaphor, I can under­stand the argu­ment despite it rather than because of it.

        What changed here was that the gov­ern­ment gave up on the act of pro­duc­tion priv­i­lege, the point I tried to make at great effort (to a very tough audi­ence) ear­lier. I would give you a metaphor for it, but I’m fresh out. Sorry.

  2. Jeff Gamso says:

    It’s cer­tainly the case that legal analy­sis func­tions through some­thing like metaphor, though more like anal­ogy I think or maybe more like the Sesame Street ques­tion of which thing is not like the other. In any event, the ques­tion you ask com­monly dic­tates the answer which is why get­ting to frame the issues and ask the ques­tions is cen­tral to suc­cess­ful legal argu­ment. All of this is a digres­sion, of course.

    But as impor­tant as ask­ing the right ques­tion or float­ing the right metaphor or what­ever exactly is con­sid­er­ing whether the court is really work­ing for­wards or back­wards. Maybe it’s because my legal career has been spent in West Texas and Ohio, maybe it’s dif­fer­ent else­where, but for the most part I find that courts do the rea­son­ing back­wards. That is, they deter­mine what is to hap­pen and then choose the legal argu­ment that gets them there. This too is a digres­sion, but an impor­tant one. It’s cen­tral to explain­ing why the choice of metaphor (question/analogy) mat­ters. You need to con­vince the court to see the issue through your prism.

    I don’t share the court’s view that the act of pro­duc­tion priv­i­lege doesn’t apply because the “exis­tence and loca­tion” of the images are known and Boucher’s already pro­duced them so there’s noth­ing incrim­i­nat­ing in doing it again. Even if that’s the proper legal test, it seems far from clear to me from either of the opin­ions that Boucher actu­ally demon­strated an abil­ity to unen­crypt the z drive. If he didn’t, he’d be pro­vid­ing proof of authen­ti­ca­tion and cus­tody and con­trol by pro­duc­ing an unen­crypted ver­sion of the drive.

    But it’s not an act of pro­duc­tion, any­way. It’s an act of creation.

    Let’s go a bit fur­ther. What the gov­ern­ment is actu­ally ask­ing is that he man­u­fac­ture a ver­sion of the drive for them. The fact that it’s eas­ily man­u­fac­tured by one who knows the passkey is nei­ther here nor there. It’s not like ask­ing for a hand­writ­ing exem­plar because that sim­ply requires copy­ing. This requires a making.

    Here’s my anal­ogy. “We know/believe you once made coun­ter­feit bills in your base­ment because you showed us. Now we have the press but can’t fig­ure out how to use it, so we’re demand­ing that you come in and print up some 20s for the grand jury.”

    I don’t think so.

    Query: Any­one know why he dropped the appeal?

  3. Soronel Haetir says:

    There are times I actu­ally would have doc­u­ments respon­sive to such a query. Not that I would expect a copy of an elec­tronic book or other ran­dom file that I pulled some ran­dom hunk of text from and then hashed would be all that helpful.

    Espe­cially since I don’t fol­low sen­tence breaks when choos­ing text.

  4. It’s all vary­ing degrees of split­ting hairs, though, isn’t it? Which, I guess, is most of what the law comes down to these days.…

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