Defending People

the tao of criminal-defense trial lawyering

Why Challenges for Cause Aren’t Enough

In response to the blaw­gos­pheric dis­cus­sion of peremp­tory chal­lenges, Min­nesota renais­sance man Joel “Jdog” Rosen­berg wrote:

As an out­sider, I’m find­ing this dis­cus­sion more than mod­er­ately inter­est­ing. I think it’s (what passes for) con­ven­tional wis­dom out­side your trade that chal­lenges for cause aren’t par­tic­u­larly dif­fi­cult to get judges to do that okay-thingee on.

In a crim­i­nal case in Texas (YMMV in the ter­ri­to­ries), either side may chal­lenge a juror for cause for any of the fol­low­ing rea­sons (lifted whole­sale from Texas Code of Crim­i­nal Pro­ce­dure Arti­cle 35.16):

  1. That the juror is not a qual­i­fied voter in the state and county under the Con­sti­tu­tion and laws of the state; pro­vided, how­ever, the fail­ure to reg­is­ter to vote shall not be a disqualification;
  2. That the juror has been con­victed of mis­de­meanor theft or a felony;
  3. That the juror is under indict­ment or other legal accu­sa­tion for mis­de­meanor theft or a felony;
  4. That the juror is insane;
  5. That the juror has such defect in the organs of feel­ing or hear­ing, or such bod­ily or men­tal defect or dis­ease as to ren­der the juror unfit for jury ser­vice, or that the juror is legally blind and the court in its dis­cre­tion is not sat­is­fied that the juror is fit for jury ser­vice in that par­tic­u­lar case;
  6. That the juror is a wit­ness in the case;
  7. That the juror served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
  8. That the juror served on a petit jury in a for­mer trial of the same case;
  9. That the juror has a bias or prej­u­dice in favor of or against the defendant;
  10. That from hearsay, or oth­er­wise, there is estab­lished in the mind of the juror such a con­clu­sion as to the guilt or inno­cence of the defen­dant as would influ­ence the juror in find­ing a ver­dict. To ascer­tain whether this cause of chal­lenge exists, the juror shall first be asked whether, in the juror’s opin­ion, the con­clu­sion so estab­lished will influ­ence the juror’s ver­dict. If the juror answers in the affir­ma­tive, the juror shall be dis­charged with­out fur­ther inter­ro­ga­tion by either party or the court. If the juror answers in the neg­a­tive, the juror shall be fur­ther exam­ined as to how the juror’s con­clu­sion was formed, and the extent to which it will affect the juror’s action; and, if it appears to have been formed from read­ing news­pa­per accounts, com­mu­ni­ca­tions, state­ments or reports or mere rumor or hearsay, and if the juror states that the juror feels able, notwith­stand­ing such opin­ion, to ren­der an impar­tial ver­dict upon the law and the evi­dence, the court, if sat­is­fied that the juror is impar­tial and will ren­der such ver­dict, may, in its dis­cre­tion, admit the juror as com­pe­tent to serve in such case. If the court, in its dis­cre­tion, is not sat­is­fied that the juror is impar­tial, the juror shall be discharged;
  11. That the juror can­not read or write.

The sec­ond, third, and fourth grounds for chal­lenge can­not be waived — a juror who admits hav­ing been con­victed of mis­de­meanor theft, for exam­ple, can­not serve on the jury even though both sides consent.

The State can chal­lenge a juror for three addi­tional reasons:

  1. That the juror has con­sci­en­tious scru­ples in regard to the inflic­tion of the pun­ish­ment of death for crime, in a cap­i­tal case, where the State is seek­ing the death penalty;
  2. That he is related within the third degree of con­san­guin­ity or affin­ity, as deter­mined under Chap­ter 573,
    Gov­ern­ment Code, to the defen­dant; and
  3. That he has a bias or prej­u­dice against any phase of the law upon which the State is enti­tled to rely for con­vic­tion or punishment.

The defense can chal­lenge a juror for two addi­tional reasons:

  1. That he is related within the third degree of con­san­guin­ity or affin­ity, as deter­mined under Chap­ter 573, Gov­ern­ment Code, to the per­son injured by the com­mis­sion of the offense, or to any pros­e­cu­tor in the case; and
  2. That he has a bias or prej­u­dice against any of the law applic­a­ble to the case upon which the defense is enti­tled to rely, either as a defense to some phase of the offense for which the defen­dant is being pros­e­cuted or as a mit­i­ga­tion thereof or of the pun­ish­ment therefor.

That’s it. Many of these rea­sons can be objec­tively dis­cov­ered. The rea­sons that criminal-defense lawyers and pros­e­cu­tors most often find them­selves wran­gling over are par­tial­ity and “bias or prejudice”.

It’s hard for most of us to admit the biases and prej­u­dices that we have, but unless a juror flat-out admits being par­tial to one side or being unable to fol­low the law, a judge has broad dis­cre­tion to grant or deny a chal­lenge for cause. For exam­ple, the court of appeals will defer to the trial court when a juror vac­il­lates on her abil­ity to fol­low the law that applies to the case. A lawyer has to jump through a cou­ple of hoops to appeal the denial of a chal­lenge for cause, which fur­ther decreases the like­li­hood that a court of appeals will cor­rect a judge’s denial of a chal­lenge for cause. Unfor­tu­nately, many judges take into account, when mak­ing legal calls, the like­li­hood that they will be reversed when they should only be con­sid­er­ing what is right.

Oddly, whether a chal­lenge for cause is granted often depends on how many other jurors have been chal­lenged for cause. When a judge looks at her list of 60 jurors and sees that 26 have already been struck for one rea­son or another, leav­ing 34 jurors, on whom each side may use 10 peremp­tory chal­lenges (which rarely coin­cide), leav­ing a the­o­ret­i­cal 14, out of which the judge wants to pick a jury of 12 with one alter­nate (after each side has used an eleventh strike on the pool of alter­nates), get­ting a jury picked appears improb­a­ble — the lawyers are likely to “bust the panel” — and the judge is less likely to grant the next chal­lenge for cause.

I’ve even seen judges hold off on rul­ing on a chal­lenge for cause until it’s clear that enough jurors will remain to form a jury; that strikes me as dis­hon­est — if a juror has pro­vided suf­fi­cient cause to ren­der her unfit to serve on the jury, she is unfit whether excus­ing her will bust the panel or not. Unfor­tu­nately again, some judges are jeal­ous pro­tec­tors of “judi­cial effi­ciency” — defined in Har­ris County as “get­ting the docket num­bers down” — even at the expense of fun­da­men­tal fairness.

Once a juror has made it clear that she will not fol­low the law, the judge has no busi­ness try­ing to cajole her into vac­il­lat­ing, say­ing the magic words, “I can fol­low the law.” Doing so risks empan­el­ing a juror who is will­ing to say the words to make the man in the black muumuu happy, but who still can’t fol­low the law. Yet there are judges who will try to reha­bil­i­tate jurors who have clearly evinced a bias. And (as I’ve noted above) the judge’s denial of a chal­lenge for cause to such a juror will be upheld by the court of appeals, which will guide many judges’ actions.

So yes, Joel, it can be very dif­fi­cult to get judges to grant chal­lenges for cause. The obsta­cles include people’s reluc­tance to admit bias, the stan­dard of review, and judges’ love of effi­ciency. Add to those a judge’s own pos­si­ble bias (gasp!) toward (or even, con­ceiv­ably, against) the State that signs his pay­check, and you can see why trial lawyers would want to hang on to as many peremp­tory chal­lenges as possible.

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About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

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3 Responses to “Why Challenges for Cause Aren’t Enough”

  1. […] sharply dif­fer­ent from mine: Patrick and Ken at Pope­hat, Scott Green­field, Mark Ben­nett (and fur­ther). (More: WSJ law blog.) Dead­line pres­sure doesn’t per­mit me to join in, but any­one interested […]

  2. JR says:

    Some­times when both sides really don’t want a par­tic­u­lar juror, one side will chal­lenge for cause and the other side will quickly agree that the chal­leng­ing side is cor­rect — even if the for-cause strike really is a stretch. This is a way to stretch the avail­able num­ber of peremp­tory challenges.

    Like you, I want to hang on to as many peremp­tory chal­lenges as pos­si­ble. I would be very unhappy if “the man” reduced the num­ber avail­able to me.

  3. Pam says:

    I recently had a vis­it­ing judge, here in Texas, state in open court “I will not have you bust this panel” and he pro­ceeded to intim­i­date the jurors in such a way that any ques­tion I asked after­ward they would look at him before answer­ing. I got the result I was work­ing for but I was incensed at the judges actions. I did my best to pre­serve error but as we got the result we were work­ing for the client refused to appeal.
    When I speak with lawyers who do not prac­tice in Texas they act as if they can­not believe this stuff really hap­pens. Hav­ing 10 peremp­tory chal­lenges saved my clients life.

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