Defending People

the tao of criminal-defense trial lawyering

Prosecutors: We’re Punishing Sinners

The lat­est dis­cus­sion of the ethics of a factually-guilty per­son putting the gov­ern­ment to its bur­den, which started with Illi­nois criminal-defense lawyer Jeremy Ritchey’s post here, then bounced to my post here and back to Jeremy’s here and onward to Vir­ginia pros­e­cu­tor Ken Lam­mers (a good dis­cus­sion will do that, you know), here, who adjusted the ques­tion from one of ethics to one of moral­ity, which didn’t escape ABA Top Crim­i­nal Law Blog­ger (and, in his spare time, New York criminal-defense lawyer) Scott Greenfield’s atten­tion; Waco criminal-defense lawyer Wal­ter Reaves fol­lowed Scott in weigh­ing in.

On Ken’s blog, Ken and fel­low Vir­ginia pros­e­cu­tor Tom McKenna (Seek­ing Jus­tice) take dif­fer­ent but com­ple­men­tary posi­tions on the immoral­ity of a wrong­doer plead­ing “not guilty.”

Tom (and Ken in his blog post, though he dis­claims the idea in a com­ment) says that “to wil­fully vio­late a just law enacted by legit­i­mate author­ity” is immoral.

Ken says (in the com­ment) that it is not nec­es­sar­ily immoral to vio­late the law, but that “not tak­ing respon­si­bil­ity for the act which she com­mit­ted” is immoral.

This is all, from a crim­i­nal lawyer’s point of view, incred­i­bly goofy.

Laws are writ­ten by peo­ple. Not only by peo­ple, but by con­gress­peo­ple. Con­gress­peo­ple have proven time after time that they can hardly be trusted to make eth­i­cal deci­sions for them­selves, much less moral deci­sions for the rest of us. The penal code, writ­ten by a com­mit­tee of con­gress­peo­ple, is in no way a moral code. Some laws are just, some are unjust, and some are just plain stu­pid. Mur­der and rap­ine (and the rest of the back half of the Deca­logue) are gen­er­ally wrong, but vio­lat­ing a stu­pid law or a reg­u­la­tory law, even if the law is not unjust, is no more immoral than not vio­lat­ing it.

Tom invokes “the chil­dren” in his argu­ment for treat­ing laws as moral
pre­cepts. For my part, I’d like for my chil­dren to be able to tell the
dif­fer­ence between the things they shouldn’t do because they’re ille­gal and the things they shouldn’t do because they’re wrong. (Oth­er­wise they might wind up prosecutors.)

Whether vio­lat­ing the law (spe­cific or gen­eral) is immoral or not, putting the gov­ern­ment to its bur­den by per­sist­ing in a plea of “not guilty” is in no wise immoral. Just as the leg­is­la­ture (being a human insti­tu­tion) is incom­pe­tent to tell us what is moral and what isn’t, the courts (being a human insti­tu­tion) are incom­pe­tent to say what the appro­pri­ate pun­ish­ment should be for our sins. Just as legal pun­ish­ment doesn’t pro­vide moral remis­sion, avoid­ing the law’s sanc­tion is not avoid­ing that favor. Messrs. Lam­mers and McKenna are there to put law­break­ers in boxes (actual and metaphor­i­cal), not to offer them abso­lu­tion. In other words, if you want to con­fess, see a priest.

If one per­son pleads guilty, he per­mits the gov­ern­ment to throw more resources at its other cases. The gov­ern­ment pros­e­cutes fac­tu­ally guilty peo­ple and fac­tu­ally inno­cent peo­ple. It can’t tell the dif­fer­ence. The more resources the gov­ern­ment throws at a case, the more likely it is to con­vict that accused. So by plead­ing guilty the fac­tu­ally guilty accused makes it more likely that a fac­tu­ally inno­cent per­son will be con­victed. That sounds immoral to me.

Share

About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

Comments

4 Responses to “Prosecutors: We’re Punishing Sinners”

  1. ken says:

    No, I said that that par­tic­u­lar post was about the immoral­ity of deny­ing respon­si­bil­ity. I was not com­ment­ing on the moral­ity of vio­lat­ing par­tic­u­lar crimes and I do not believe that the mere act of a leg­is­la­ture pass­ing a statute makes a law legit­i­mate. On the other hand, I don’t buy the malum in se / malum pro­hibi­tum dis­tinc­tion either. I am writ­ing a post about this and hope to have it up in the morning.

  2. Mark Bennett says:

    Once a defen­dant has bro­ken the law, the per­sonal moral respon­si­bil­ity for the act lies at her feet. As such, she acts immorally if she denies that responsibility.

    I under­stand that you didn’t mean it the way it reads.

  3. sctexas says:

    So by plead­ing guilty the fac­tu­ally guilty accused makes it more likely that a fac­tu­ally inno­cent per­son will be con­victed. That sounds immoral to me.”

    Man that’s a huge, and quite unnec­es­sary, shift of responsibility.

  4. […] whether break­ing the law is, in itself, an immoral act. The dis­cus­sion went from pros­e­cu­tor to defender, across the coun­try, and it cov­ered most of the issues, specif­i­cally revolv­ing around the morality […]

Leave a non-anonymous Reply