Defending People

the tao of criminal-defense trial lawyering

Justice vs. Fairness

Illi­nois criminal-defense lawyer Jeremy Richey asks, “is it eth­i­cal to plead not guilty” when you know that you are fac­tu­ally guilty? He (being a criminal-defense lawyer) gets the answer right, of course: no [edit: duh, yes].

But I’ve been think­ing: in addi­tion to the fact that any boob who has ever sat through an episode of Law and Order thinks him­self an expert on the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem by virtue of that expe­ri­ence, one of the fac­tors that helps make seri­ous dis­cus­sion of crim­i­nal jus­tice issues radioac­tive is that peo­ple think that words in the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem have the same mean­ing as in The World.

In The World, “not guilty” means “didn’t do it.” Not so in the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem, where it means, “the gov­ern­ment hasn’t proven it.”

Guilty” means “did it” in The World. Often in the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem it coin­ci­den­tally seems to mean the same thing, but some­times it instead means “the wit­nesses lied too well”.

Inno­cent” in The World is the oppo­site of “guilty” — that is, fac­tu­ally inno­cent. In the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem, a fac­tu­ally (or actu­ally) inno­cent per­son can be guilty. (Ask RR about that.)

Even the word “jus­tice” in the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem doesn’t mean the same thing that it means in The World. The sys­tem is not designed to pro­vide a morally or socially just result, that is, to pun­ish sin­ners or to restore those who have been injured. It’s designed to enforce rules writ­ten by peo­ple to keep order and main­tain the sta­tus quo. If main­te­nance of the sta­tus quo coin­cides with moral or social jus­tice, it’s no more than a happy coincidence.

When those who haven’t given much con­sid­er­a­tion to the nature of the crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem con­fuse “guilty” with “fac­tu­ally guilty”, “not guilty” with “inno­cent”, and “jus­tice” with “fair­ness”, great con­fu­sion results. To remind peo­ple of this, it may be appro­pri­ate to put “jus­tice” in doubt quotes when talk­ing about the system.

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About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

Comments

15 Responses to “Justice vs. Fairness”

  1. Okay, I guess I’m more con­fused than usual. I would have thought that the crim­i­nal defense lawyer’s answer (which, by coin­ci­dence, also is mine) to “is it eth­i­cal to plead not guilty when you know you are fac­tu­ally guilty,” is, “yes” just as the answer to “is it uneth­i­cal to plead not guilty when you know you are fac­tu­ally guilty,” is “No.”

  2. Ken says:

    Mark, I think your first sen­tence needs to say “is it uneth­i­cal to plead not guilty.” Unless I am entirely miss­ing your point.

  3. Mark Bennett says:

    You are both cor­rect. I’m going to start send­ing my blog posts out for proofing.

  4. This really is intro­duc­tion to jus­tice stuff, but we keep telling under­grad­u­ates — jus­tice is a process, fair­ness is an outcome.

    • Mark Bennett says:

      No no no no no. Jus­tice is both a process (pro­ce­dural jus­tice) and an out­come (sub­stan­tive jus­tice). The Sys­tem is con­cerned only with pro­ce­dural jus­tice, but peo­ple in The World still care about (and hope for) sub­stan­tive justice.

  5. What you call “pro­ce­dural jus­tice” I call due process. An unjust result does not become “jus­tice” merely because the law has been metic­u­lously applied. Such use of the term “jus­tice” sim­ply weasels all the mean­ing out of the term.

    To say “jus­tice is a process” is only an apolo­getic for injus­tice accord­ing to law; law pro­fes­sors like to use such weasel words to avoid hav­ing their stu­dents wor­ry­ing about jus­tice, or what they like to call “pub­lic pol­icy.” Law should be a means of cod­i­fy­ing jus­tice. When appli­ca­tion of the law results in an injus­tice, the law becomes a per­ver­sion of its own prin­ci­ple. We should not allow our­selves to get sucked into the trap of con­tend­ing that “jus­tice has been done” when the out­come is an injus­tice. That bestows upon the sys­tem an air of legit­i­macy that it has not earned, and does not merit, when the result is an injustice.

    The typ­i­cal response to that argu­ment, of course, is that jus­tice is sub­jec­tive. I will use my own val­u­a­tion of what is an injus­tice. Whose val­u­a­tion would you have me use? Whose val­u­a­tion would you use? How­ever, I think there is far less diver­gence on these issues than is com­monly believed — and I also think that when dis­agree­ment does occur it should be rec­og­nized and debated, not swept under the rug with the myth of “pro­ce­dural justice.”

    • Mark Bennett says:

      Are you say­ing that out­come is every­thing, so that a fair out­come is just regard­less of the fair­ness of the process?

      I want to clar­ify because that’d be an odd posi­tion for a crim­i­nal defense lawyer to take. We fre­quently (and prop­erly) seek pro­ce­dural jus­tice (a fair sys­tem, due process) for our clients with no regard for what we might con­sider the sub­stan­tive jus­tice of the case.

      Pro­ce­dural injus­tice both­ers me more than sub­stan­tive injus­tice because a) I know that I know pro­ce­dural injus­tice when I see it (like Clarence Dar­row, I don’t believe that we can truly say who deserves what); b) pro­ce­dural jus­tice is within our reach as human beings; and c) while pro­ce­dural jus­tice doesn’t guar­an­tee sub­stan­tive jus­tice, pro­ce­dural injus­tice guar­an­tees sub­stan­tive injustice.

  6. Clay S. Conrad says:

    I don’t under­stand what you mean by a “fair” out­come. I can’t assess that.

    I do think the out­come is more impor­tant than the process, per se. I’ve had clients acquit­ted after unfair tri­als. While in each case I had no qualms about the out­come, I could not say the trial was fair, as the judge was obvi­ously prej­u­diced against us, and that prej­u­dice was reflected in the rul­ings. I lost lit­tle sleep over those cases. Thus, pro­ce­dural injus­tice in those cases cer­tainly did not guar­an­tee a sub­stan­tively unjust outcome.

    The goal of due process, and of the legal sys­tem itself, should be to pro­cure a sub­stan­tively just out­come for the defen­dant. When it fails to do so, the legal sys­tem itself has failed.

    By sub­stan­tively just, I do not mean con­vic­tion of the guilty, per se. I mean a just out­come. Con­vic­tion on an unjust law can never be just, no mat­ter how plain the guilt. A dra­con­ian sen­tence can never be just. (Isn’t “an eye for an eye,” which we imag­ine to be so harsh, much more lenient than two years for a gram of blow, ten years for fifty pounds of weed, or 20 years for felony theft?) Con­vic­tion fol­low­ing a sys­tem that has vio­lated the Defendant’s con­sti­tu­tional rights, or fol­low­ing State per­jury, can never be just — as the State vio­la­tion of those rights is a far worse crime than what­ever the Defen­dant is accused of.

    I am not say­ing that due process (pro­ce­dural jus­tice, to use your term) is not a com­po­nent of jus­tice. (To my mind, the mere ARREST of a morally inno­cent per­son is an injus­tice, even if the per­son is legally guilty; the dif­fer­ence between the arrest and con­vic­tion is one of degree only.) I am sim­ply say­ing that due process is a nec­es­sary, but not suf­fi­cient, con­di­tion of hav­ing jus­tice done.

    My rea­son for respond­ing is that I believe that call­ing due process “pro­ce­dural jus­tice” cheap­ens the term jus­tice. It dilutes it; for an inno­cent per­son to be arrested, tried, con­victed, and exe­cuted, all accord­ing to law, is not jus­tice no mat­ter how metic­u­lously their pro­ce­dural rights were respected. While per­fect jus­tice is impos­si­ble (I can­not imag­ine a sys­tem in which fac­tu­ally inno­cent peo­ple are never arrested) we should not become jaded to sub­stan­tive injus­tice that we, as lawyers, do not feel it, as if on our own backs. Shrug­ging it off as “jus­tice,” merely because the legal sys­tem has done its job, seems like an abdi­ca­tion of respon­si­bil­ity to me.

    What I like about being a lawyer is that every once in a while, if you are lucky, work hard, seek help when you need it, out­smart the State, and use every trick, resource, and skill at your dis­posal, you can wrest jus­tice, kick­ing and scream­ing, out of the legal sys­tem. But I see that out­come as the excep­tion, not the rule, and it is easy to get dispir­ited by the fact that in many, many cases — most — jus­tice is not attain­able. The inat­tain­abil­ity of jus­tice is what causes burnout, and, in fact, so many sui­cides amongst the defense bar. I find it helps to lay that par­tic­u­lar card on the table, and keep trying.

  7. Mark Bennett says:

    Clay,

    Pro­ce­dural injus­tice doesn’t nec­es­sar­ily guar­an­tee sub­stan­tive injus­tice in each par­tic­u­lar case, but systemically.

    The crim­i­nal “jus­tice” sys­tem is and — because it is designed and admin­is­tered by humans — always will be a mis­er­able fail­ure at dis­pens­ing sub­stan­tive jus­tice (what I like to call “Jus­tice with a big J”).

    Pro­ce­dural jus­tice with­out Jus­tice is thin gruel, unless Jus­tice would have meant my client losing.

    I think it’s help­ful to tell The World that the “crim­i­nal jus­tice” that eponymizes The Sys­tem is not what The World calls Jus­tice. I don’t think you and I dis­agree by much on that.

  8. Mark Bennett says:

    Fair” is, I think, a fair syn­onym for “just”.

  9. shg says:

    Inter­est­ing. I was more hung up on Jeremy’s use of the word “eth­i­cal” in the first place, in that ethics have noth­ing to do with mechan­ics of chal­leng­ing an accu­sa­tion in a com­plex sys­tem, regard­less of fac­tual guilt or innocence.

    I agree with Bennett’s posi­tion that pro­ce­dural due process is a nec­es­sary com­po­nent of sys­temic jus­tice, though not a guar­an­tee of a cor­rect out­come. Ulti­mately, a just out­come is sub­jec­tive. As a lawyer, I am less con­cerned with “jus­tice” than pre­vail­ing. I’m fine with a not guilty ver­dict, even though it may not meet everyone’s idea of jus­tice. As a cit­i­zen, my expec­ta­tion of the sys­tem is dif­fer­ent. Let’s not for­get that we don’t fight for jus­tice, but for our clients. We demand jus­tice when it serves our pur­poses, and shield our clients from jus­tice when it doesn’t. Let’s not for­get that jus­tice may not always be the best thing for our clients.

  10. Clay S. Conrad says:

    Of course “jus­tice” is sub­jec­tive. So is rea­son­able doubt (or any stan­dard with the word “rea­son­able” in it.) So is obscen­ity. So are many, many things we deal with daily. We don’t shy away from those terms, or try to define them out of existence.

    As for ethics being sub­jec­tive, I agree entirely. I also agree that there is a huge dif­fer­ence between being “eth­i­cal” and fol­low­ing the eth­i­cal rules, which often have noth­ing to do with ethics. For exam­ple, I know of a lawyer who got a pub­lic rep­ri­mand for fail­ing to inform his client of his appel­late rights. While, gen­er­ally, that sounds rea­son­able, the client hap­pened to also be a lawyer who did alot of appeals. So what was the point in advis­ing him of his appel­late rights? The rules require it, even if it is an exer­cise in futil­ity. But to call it uneth­i­cal to fail to tell a client what he already knows is absurd.

  11. Katie says:

    on 22 Dec 2008 at 10:48 pm6Clay S. Con­rad
    Thank you for your com­pas­sion and empa­thy in pur­suit of the inat­tain­abil­ity of Jus­tice for your clients but I ques­tion your com­ment re ‘The inat­tain­abil­ity of jus­tice is what causes burnout, and, in fact, so many sui­cides amongst the defense bar.’ as a ques­tion­albe fact. Burnout, yes; sui­cides, no.

  12. Mark Bennett says:

    This is an exam­ple of an anony­mous com­menter with no cred­i­bil­ity, vs. an iden­ti­fied (and known) com­menter. We know that Clay knows his stuff; it’s pos­si­ble, despite that, that Katie is right, but she’s given us no rea­son to believe that she is.

  13. […] Peo­ple, I would.  In par­tic­u­lar, if they wrote items as good as Bennett’s recent post on the dif­fer­ences between a lawyer’s and a layman’s under­stand­ing of the term “jus­tice&#…, and the impor­tance of pro­ce­dural fair­ness to a soci­ety that claims to be run with the con­sent of […]

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