Defending People

the tao of criminal-defense trial lawyering

Guest Post: Jury Nullification — A Prosecutor’s View

The fol­low­ing was sent to me by a pros­e­cu­tor who wishes to remain anony­mous. (No, it’s not AHCL.) I dis­agree with him — I think he’s miss­ing at least one essen­tial point (that jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is the law, so that a nul­li­fy­ing ver­dict is a ver­dict “accord­ing to the law”) — but he’s not entirely crazy, and I thought I’d toss it out for dis­cus­sion. Enjoy and com­ment (pag­ing Clay Con­rad). (Do I need to say that opin­ions expressed below the line don’t reflect my views?)


I just can’t leave this one alone.

I feel com­pelled to address the com­pletely out­ra­geous, legally and­fac­tu­ally unjus­ti­fi­able act that you and the writ­ers of The Wire are encouraging.

So let’s not dis­cuss free will, etc. We’ll even leave out the admit­tedly dubi­ous mer­its of the WoD for the moment. Let’s talk about one thing and one thing only: Jury nullification.

Can you please explain to me how jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is not a gross and uncon­scionable vio­la­tion of the juror’s oath? As you well know, in Texas (and I sus­pect most other states as well) the jurors must swear, prior to being impan­eled, that they will “a true ver­dict ren­der, based on the law and the evi­dence pre­sented.” Read those words closely, and if I’ve left any out, please let me know. It doesn’t say “unless I dis­agree with the law in ques­tion,” or “unless I’m against the WoD.” It doesn’t men­tion jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion or even civil disobedience!

The Zenger case is often trot­ted out as the ulti­mate exam­ple of jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion. But some­how I doubt the jurors in that case ever took such a spe­cific oath. Mod­ern jurors are promis­ing, in very spe­cific terms, that they are going to ren­der a TRUE ver­dict, based on the LAW and the FACTS pre­sented. Jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion ignores all three of those things: The ver­dict will not be true, but will in fact be inten­tion­ally, know­ingly, will­fully and (I might add, to go out­side of mens reas BLATANTLY false. The jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion ver­dict will not be based on the law, because it sets out to dis­re­gard the law because it is viewed as immoral, wrong, etc. Finally, the jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion ver­dict will most cer­tainly not be based on the facts, because it chooses to ignore those facts as a mat­ter of course.

How, then, do pro­po­nents of jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion jus­tify their posi­tion that mod­ern jurors are legally autho­rized to employ this fan­ci­fully archaic con­cept? Is it sim­ply under­stood that the whole juror’s oath is but a sub­terfuge, and that the rene­gade juror must engage in this decep­tion as a means to an end?

The writ­ers of The Wire, in advo­cat­ing the actions that they have, are essen­tially pro­mot­ing the com­mis­sion of a crime. Had they made the state­ments con­tained in the Time mag­a­zine arti­cle in Texas, then they would almost cer­tainly be guilty of aggra­vated per­jury. Out­ra­geous, no? How dare I sug­gest that the exer­cise of their First Amend­ment rights could pos­si­bly con­sti­tute a crime? Pretty eas­ily, actu­ally. Just look at the law.

Per­jury and aggra­vated per­jury are defined as follows:

P.C. 37.02 Perjury

(a) A per­son com­mits an offense if, with intent to deceive and with knowl­edge of the statement’s meaning:

(1) he makes a false state­ment under oath or swears to the truth of a false state­ment pre­vi­ously made and the state­ment is required or autho­rized by law to be made under oath

***

P.C. 37.03 Aggra­vated Perjury

(a) A per­son com­mits an offense if he com­mits per­jury as defined in Sec­tion 37.02, and the false statement:

(1) is made dur­ing or in con­nec­tion with an offi­cial pro­ceed­ing; and

(2) is material.

(b) An offense under this sec­tion is a felony of the third degree.

The writ­ers of The Wire are telling their read­ers to pre­med­i­tat­edly vio­late this statute. By tak­ing the juror’s oath, a juror who plans on engag­ing in jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is mak­ing a false state­ment under oath, and the state­ment could hardly be more mate­r­ial to the pro­ceed­ing! The ele­ments of per­jury are thus met. The vio­la­tion is even more egre­gious since it is planned out in advance. The jurors enter the court­room hav­ing already formed the intent to com­mit jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion in nar­cotics cases, regard­less of the evi­dence (“save for a pros­e­cu­tion in which acts of vio­lence or intended vio­lence are alleged” of course, accord­ing to the sanc­ti­mo­nious and high-minded dri­vel put out in the arti­cle). Since it is pre­med­i­tated, the jurors’ oath is false at the moment the jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion juror is tak­ing it.

So how are The Wire writ­ers guilty? Texas law fur­ther provides:

P.C. 7.02 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER.

(a) A per­son is crim­i­nally respon­si­ble for an offense com­mit­ted by the con­duct of another if:

***

(2) act­ing with intent to pro­mote or assist the com­mis­sion of the offense, he solic­its, encour­ages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other per­son to com­mit the offense

***

The Wire writ­ers are, to put it bluntly, encour­ag­ing and direct­ing their read­ers to break the law. And, let’s face it, that’s exactly what jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is: Break­ing the law. Not to men­tion break­ing your oath, lying, and a host of other things your mother prob­a­bly told you not to do.

In Amer­ica, God bless her, we do have legit­i­mate forms of protest. We have the right of free speech and we have the right of assem­bly. The series of tubes known as The Inter­nets is prob­a­bly the great­est vehi­cle ever for exer­cis­ing both of these fun­da­men­tal rights. Jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is not a legit­i­mate form of protest any more than rob­bing a bank is a legit­i­mate form of protest against unfair lend­ing prac­tices or the sub­prime mort­gage cri­sis. So what are we left with? you ask. What recourse do we have against the tyranny of the evil WoD?

Well, in Amer­ica, God bless her, we also have some­thing known as a democ­racy, and along with it the right to vote. We have elected leg­is­la­tures whose pre­cise pur­pose is to enact the will of the peo­ple. If you dis­agree with the WoD, the solu­tion is to vote for a can­di­date who will cease that war and legal­ize nar­cotics. The solu­tion is not to lie under oath and delib­er­ately per­vert the jus­tice sys­tem. Jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion under­mines con­fi­dence in the judi­ciary at a time when that con­fi­dence is already trag­i­cally low. It opens a whole range of unpleas­ant ques­tions about inequities in its appli­ca­tion. After all, if jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is to be car­ried out in drug cases, then why not resist­ing arrest cases, DWI cases, or even mur­der cases? After all, those laws could be con­sid­ered to rep­re­sent a war on peo­ple with oppo­si­tional defi­ant dis­or­ders, alco­hol prob­lems, or anger man­age­ment issues. Ask the defen­dants and their fam­ily mem­bers if THEY would pre­fer the jurors to ignore the facts. I’ll bet the can­did ones would say yes in a heartbeat.

Jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion, for all the noble prose and lib­er­atar­ian philoso­phies behind it, has no place in the mod­ern crim­i­nal jus­tice sys­tem. As a pros­e­cu­tor, I com­mit my jurors to fol­low­ing the law, and I ask if they can promise to do that and con­vict if I prove my case to them beyond a rea­son­able doubt. It’s a proper and appro­pri­ate ques­tion (even under Stande­fer ) and the peo­ple who are hon­est enough to say “No” get to go home. If you dis­agree with the WoD, that is your free gift from our jus­tice sys­tem. You are hereby exempted from jury ser­vice. And there is no shame in it, either. I often ask my pan­elists if, for rea­sons of per­sonal con­vic­tion or belief, they sim­ply can­not fol­low a cer­tain law. They have that oppor­tu­nity to speak. (And for per­jury enthu­si­asts, I should add that voir dire is con­ducted under oath, as well.) I do not ask any­one to enforce a law they are dead set against if it would vio­late their con­science to do so. There is noth­ing wrong with admit­ting that you can­not or will not abide by your oath and fol­low the law. What IS wrong is cal­cu­lat­edly con­ceal­ing that fact for the pur­pose of sub­vert­ing the legal process. That can and should lead to trou­bles that are — to bor­row from The Wire writ­ers again — far from fictional.

Share

About The Author

Mark Bennett got his letter of marque from the Supreme Court of Texas in May 1995. He is famous for having no sense of humor when it comes to totalitarianism.

Comments

111 Responses to “Guest Post: Jury Nullification — A Prosecutor’s View”

  1. ECV says:

    Here’s a sim­ple — I hope — ques­tion from a layper­son: How many suc­cess­ful pros­e­cu­tions are there each year in the United States of jurors or prospec­tive jurors for: (a) lying under oath about their oppo­si­tion to the law or laws under which the defen­dant is charged, their intent to dis­re­gard the judge’s instruc­tions, or their intent to acquit the defen­dant irre­spec­tive of the evi­dence pre­sented dur­ing the trial; or (b) fail­ing to vol­un­teer that they are aware of jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion, whether or not they intend to prac­tice it in the instant case?

  2. Mark Bennett says:

    ECV — Simple.

    a) Zero.

    b) Zero.

  3. Jake Witmer says:

    I didn’t have time to read all of the above, but let me point out a few rel­e­vant facts anyway:

    [If you don’t have time to read oth­ers’ com­ments, why would any­one bother to read yours? I’m cut­ting out the mid­dle­man and delet­ing the rest. MB]

  4. FWIW, I see sev­eral folks try­ing to reduce a dif­fi­cult ques­tion to a sim­ple one, start­ing with the anon guest blogger.

    Yup, it is a sim­ple issue, gen­er­ally speak­ing: peo­ple ought not, by and large, make promises that they don’t intend to keep. But even the law — which, as we know, is an ass — rec­og­nizes excep­tions to that; duress, say. Point a gun at my head and make me promise to pay you twenty bucks, and I don’t have to keep that promise.

    Jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion is much the same thing, even though the metaphor­i­cal gun is, by and large, pointed at some­body else’s head. Windy brings up the Richard Paey case, which is an easy exam­ple. A guy who’s done not a damn thing wrong is put on trial, with huge penal­ties if he’s con­victed of the crime of which he is, no ques­tion, guilty.

    Com­pared to putting him in a cell for years, what’s lit­tle fib? — which, by the way, is made under duress. (If an erst­while juror actu­ally tells the truth dur­ing voir dire, and the actual truth is, “I’m going to do what makes sense to me and my con­science, and if that’s not in accord with what you and that per­son in the black robes think, I do hope you’ll suf­fer great men­tal anguish,” think that they’re safe from a con­tempt citation?)

    But that’s an easy case, and even there, there are some reper­cus­sions to doing the right thing in that instance. (The chance of stop­ping the insane War on Some Drugs goes down, just a lit­tle, when jury nul­li­fi­ca­tions hap­pen only in such obvi­ous and egre­gious cases.) Yup, in another easy case, it’s wrong to let the white mur­der­ers of a civil rights worker, proven guilty beyond a rea­son­able doubt, go because they’re white guys. But it’s wrong not because of the fib involved in tak­ing the oath, but because, well, it’s the wrong decision.

    Get­ting on a jury while being con­sciously will­ing to engage in nul­li­fi­ca­tion is, in and of itself, a lit­tle fib. Any grownup should know that lit­tle fibs are some­times okay. Depends on the situation.

    But sure, absent some good enough rea­son to fib, it’s wrong to fib. And if you can totally ignore all the good rea­sons why a good per­son might fib, we’re back to the old Abe Lin­coln bit: if you call a tail a leg, how many legs does a lamb have?

    Answer: four. Because call­ing a tail a leg doesn’t make it one. And nei­ther does call­ing jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion inher­ently wrong make it so.

  5. […] explor­ing the sub­ject. The blo­gos­phere seems to be full of both avid pro­po­nents (here and here) and vig­or­ous oppo­si­tion (which argues directly against this arti­cle in Time […]

  6. Jim Kirby says:

    I am aware that the words of the Texas Con­sti­tu­tion still state that a juror can­not be excluded from serv­ing “pro­vided he acknowl­edge the exis­tence of a Supreme Being.” The fact that a fed­eral court has nul­li­fied that clause is irrelevant.

    Sorry, but I can­not sup­port the Texas Con­sti­tu­tion and feel morally oblig­ated to sub­vert it. Jury Nul­li­fi­ca­tion is only one way to exer­cise my protest.

  7. Kenneth Unger says:

    An inter­est­ing op-ed piece in today’s (12÷20÷2011) NY Times: “Jurors Need to Know That They Can Say No” By Paul But­ler at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/jurors-can-say-no.html?ref=opinion, fur­ther sup­ports the right and desir­abil­ity of jury nullification.

  8. Clay S. Conrad says:

    Just couldn’t help but post this: a fed­eral judge in NY, Kimba Wood, just ruled that efforts to dis­trib­ute jury nul­li­fi­ca­tion lit­er­a­ture out­side a fed­eral dis­trict court in Man­hat­tan were NOT ille­gal, because they were not aimed at a spe­cific case or spe­cific issue, but were pro­tected First Amend­ment activities.

    Anony­mous cow­ardly pros­e­cu­tor: 0
    Folks like me: 1

  9. Ed McKown says:

    I approached this issue from a 6th Amend­ment per­spec­tive; the defendant’s right to an impar­tial jury.

    In 1794, Chief Jus­tice John Jay, writ­ing for the unan­i­mous opin­ion of the Supreme Court, deter­mined that jurors had the right to deter­mine both the law and the facts of a case. See State v. Brails­ford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794).

    This right must have con­sti­tuted at least in part, if not in whole, the def­i­n­i­tion of an impar­tial jury. The tak­ing away of such a fun­da­men­tal right from the jury must nec­es­sar­ily cre­ate an imbal­ance in favor of the State in crim­i­nal pro­ceed­ings. The bal­ance must not shift in favor of the State because the 6th Amend­ment is a lim­i­ta­tion on State pow­ers not a mal­leable set of the­o­ret­i­cal rights which the State can manip­u­late in order to deprive the accused of a fun­da­men­tal right.

    The OP couches all of his argu­ments in mod­ern jurispru­dence with good rea­son. That being, the founders do not agree with the OP’s mod­ern inter­pre­ta­tion. Theophilus Par­sons at the Mass­a­chu­setts con­ven­tion of 1788 upon the vote for adop­tion of the United States Con­sti­tu­tion; an objec­tion was heard con­cern­ing the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Con­sti­tu­tion. Par­sons stated, “The peo­ple them­selves have it in their power effec­tu­ally to resist usurpa­tion, with­out being dri­ven to an appeal to arms…Let him be con­sid­ered as a crim­i­nal by the gen­eral gov­ern­ment; yet only his fellow-citizens can con­vict him. They are his jury, and, if they pro­nounce him inno­cent, not all the pow­ers of con­gress can hurt him; and inno­cent they cer­tainly will pro­nounce him if the sup­posed law he resisted was an act of usurpa­tion.” [2 Elliot, Deb. 94; 2 Ban­croft, Hit. Const. 267].

    Up until Jan­u­ary 21, 1895, the com­mon law of the land had been that the jury could deter­mine both the facts and the law of a case. In 1895, Jus­tice Har­lan wrote the major­ity opin­ion in Sparf v. United States. For one hun­dred and one (101) years, a unan­i­mous deci­sion from the Supreme Court held sway ensur­ing that every juror had the right to deter­mine both the facts and law of a case. By exten­sion, the accused stand­ing before those jurors enjoyed the ben­e­fits the found­ing fathers intended when the Con­sti­tu­tion guar­an­teed the right to an impar­tial jury. The unan­i­mous deci­sion reached in Brails­ford was ulti­mately defeated by a major­ity opin­ion in Sparf which appears on its face to make every effort to undue that which was already done. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).

    In reach­ing the deci­sion in Sparf, Jus­tice Har­lan was con­strained by the deci­sion in Brails­ford. Instead of nar­rowly con­stru­ing a jurors right to deter­mine the law as expressed by Jus­tice Jay, Har­lan con­cluded the report­ing of Jus­tice Jay’s words were incor­rect. Har­lan relies on the words of Jus­tice Cur­tis who states, “The whole case was an anom­aly. If it be cor­rectly reported, I can only say it is not in accor­dance with the views of any other court…in this coun­try or in Eng­land”. Id at 65.

    From there my analy­sis cen­tered around Florida jurispru­dence and the his­toric time­line. Florida is inter­est­ing to me because a statute con­tin­ues to exist which man­dates the jury be told the penalty. See s. 918.10 Fla. Stat. (2011). The Florida Court quickly deter­mined the statute to be con­sti­tu­tion­ally invalid under the Sep­a­ra­tion of Pow­ers doc­trine. See In re Florida Rules of Crim­i­nal Pro­ce­dure, 272 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972).

    The Florida Supreme Court, begin­ning in 1972 goes into an impres­sive series of back flips in deter­min­ing that “must” means “may”, “shall” means “may” and finally (with back against the wall) deter­mines “must” means “must”. Defense lawyers had lit­tle time to rejoice once the Court amended its rules of crim­i­nal pro­ce­dure; finally get­ting it right on the third try. See Fla. R. Crim. P. §3.390(a).

    The OP restricts his analy­sis because to do oth­er­wise would shed light on the his­tor­i­cal time­line and give cre­dence to the orig­i­nal intent of the founders and the Supreme Court. The term Jury Nul­li­fi­ca­tion has been rede­fined much like lib­eral and con­ser­v­a­tive. The right of the jury to nul­lify was intended as a stop gap mea­sure when the gov­ern­ment over­reached and there was no proper rem­edy. It is as nec­es­sary now in that role as it was in 1789 and will con­tinue to be as long as men gov­ern men.

    My apolo­gies if this was a bit ver­bose but I believe there still exists par­tic­u­lar reme­dies within the court­room which may in the end over­turn bad case law.

  10. Ronald Kranig says:

    All I can say is that WHEN the State’s Attorney’s office is more con­cerned about jus­tice than it does convictions.……THEN I will dis­agree with the nul­li­fi­ca­tion rights of a jury. For exam­ple, WHEN the peo­ple see that the State (rou­tinely rather than NEVER) pros­e­cutes their own prior “state’s wit­nesses” for com­mit­ting per­jury to get an inno­cent defen­dant con­victed of a crime.…which includes Police Officers…then the escape of a nul­li­fi­ca­tion rul­ing should dis­ap­pear but that is like ask­ing to see that all Major League Pitch­ers apol­o­gize if they hit a bat­ter and didn’t mean to.

  11. If “true ver­dict” only meant “ver­dict accord­ing to the law”, there would never be any need for a jury at all.

    A ver­dict is true only if it is just. If the defen­dant is guilty of break­ing an obvi­ously unjust law, or if the law as applied to the defendant’s spe­cific cir­cum­stances is unjust, then the only true ver­dict is Not Guilty.

    That said, I’m a lot more cau­tious about singing the praises of nul­li­fi­ca­tion than I used to be at one time. I con­sider those peo­ple tried and acquit­ted for lynch­ings by nul­li­fiers, and con­sider how many gay/lesbian/transgender, immi­grant, lib­eral, athe­ist, etc. peo­ple might die, and their mur­der­ers be acquit­ted, in Texas today if nul­li­fi­ca­tion were more respectable than it cur­rently is.

    Bot­tom line: all law is only as good and just as the peo­ple who make it, enforce it, and live under it.

Leave a non-anonymous Reply