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	<title>Comments on: You Can Always Say No</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html</link>
	<description>the tao of criminal-defense trial lawyering</description>
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		<title>By: Shane</title>
		<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/comment-page-1#comment-942</link>
		<dc:creator>Shane</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 27 Jan 2008 00:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/?p=481#comment-942</guid>
		<description>Oh, yeah, you&#039;re right. I guess what I was talking about is entirely irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is whether the authorities can compel self-incriminating testimony.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;One such solution to this kind of case is a &lt;a HREF=&quot;http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume.php&quot; REL=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;high/low password system&lt;/a&gt; where an encrypted volume is created with 2 passwords, one that allows access to the real deal and one that allows access to a decoy volume with sensitive but nonincriminating data. I&#039;m not sure if PGP can do this, but the free program TrueCrypt can.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, yeah, you&#8217;re right. I guess what I was talking about is entirely irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is whether the authorities can compel self-incriminating testimony.</p>
<p>One such solution to this kind of case is a <a HREF="http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume.php" REL="nofollow">high/low password system</a> where an encrypted volume is created with 2 passwords, one that allows access to the real deal and one that allows access to a decoy volume with sensitive but nonincriminating data. I&#8217;m not sure if PGP can do this, but the free program TrueCrypt can.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark Bennett</title>
		<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/comment-page-1#comment-938</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark Bennett</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 22:52:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/?p=481#comment-938</guid>
		<description>Shane,&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;I will immediately eat the post-it with my password.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The government doesn&#039;t have any right to get you to confess, even if you confessed before. You don&#039;t waive the Fifth forever by running your mouth once. For example, the government can&#039;t call even a confessing defendant to the stand to testify.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The government may still have enough evidence to prove the case. It may be that, as usual, they&#039;re just trying to make their job as easy as possible. When we confess, all we do is make the government&#039;s job easier.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Shane,</p>
<p>I will immediately eat the post-it with my password.</p>
<p>The government doesn&#8217;t have any right to get you to confess, even if you confessed before. You don&#8217;t waive the Fifth forever by running your mouth once. For example, the government can&#8217;t call even a confessing defendant to the stand to testify.</p>
<p>The government may still have enough evidence to prove the case. It may be that, as usual, they&#8217;re just trying to make their job as easy as possible. When we confess, all we do is make the government&#8217;s job easier.</p>
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		<title>By: Shane</title>
		<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/comment-page-1#comment-937</link>
		<dc:creator>Shane</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 22:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/?p=481#comment-937</guid>
		<description>Strong encryption, like the algorithms used by PGP and others, are really good. Trying to defeat those is usually a waste of time and resources.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;However, security is one of those things that are only as good as its weakest link. A secure encryption scheme is worthless if you save the password in an unencrypted file on the computer, or worse yet, leave it on a post-it note by your monitor. The FBI has successfully used warrants to install trojans and keystroke loggers to find passwords for strong encryption, which have resulted in convictions. There are quite a few methods for cryptanalysis that do not require actually attacking the algorithm. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Mark, I&#039;m not entirely convinced that the rape analogy is, well, analogous. In essence, the suspect &quot;confessed&quot; to a law enforcement officer who did not record the confession, and the authorities are trying to get him to confess again.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Now, I&#039;m not a lawyer, just some ordinary citizen who really cares about civil liberties, so I&#039;m curious - would the border patrol officer&#039;s testimony be good enough in court? Or would the prosecutor really have to produce the physical evidence to have a case?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;And Michael - there are plenty of open-source/free implementations of Elliptical Curve Cryptography out there. Are you saying that there are proprietary algorithms that are better, or that these algorithms are not free to use without a license? That&#039;s what always irritated me about crypto algorithms - the source should be published and peer-reviewed to ensure security, but that just makes it easy to use without a license, especially non-commercially.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Strong encryption, like the algorithms used by PGP and others, are really good. Trying to defeat those is usually a waste of time and resources.</p>
<p>However, security is one of those things that are only as good as its weakest link. A secure encryption scheme is worthless if you save the password in an unencrypted file on the computer, or worse yet, leave it on a post-it note by your monitor. The FBI has successfully used warrants to install trojans and keystroke loggers to find passwords for strong encryption, which have resulted in convictions. There are quite a few methods for cryptanalysis that do not require actually attacking the algorithm. </p>
<p>Mark, I&#8217;m not entirely convinced that the rape analogy is, well, analogous. In essence, the suspect &#8220;confessed&#8221; to a law enforcement officer who did not record the confession, and the authorities are trying to get him to confess again.</p>
<p>Now, I&#8217;m not a lawyer, just some ordinary citizen who really cares about civil liberties, so I&#8217;m curious &#8211; would the border patrol officer&#8217;s testimony be good enough in court? Or would the prosecutor really have to produce the physical evidence to have a case?</p>
<p>And Michael &#8211; there are plenty of open-source/free implementations of Elliptical Curve Cryptography out there. Are you saying that there are proprietary algorithms that are better, or that these algorithms are not free to use without a license? That&#8217;s what always irritated me about crypto algorithms &#8211; the source should be published and peer-reviewed to ensure security, but that just makes it easy to use without a license, especially non-commercially.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark Bennett</title>
		<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/comment-page-1#comment-935</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark Bennett</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 18:37:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/?p=481#comment-935</guid>
		<description>Hi, Michael. So you&#039;re saying you don&#039;t think NSA is reading our PGP-encrypted mail yet?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;What&#039;s the company with all the IP?&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;SHG,&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Ah, yes. Paree. I remember it well.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi, Michael. So you&#8217;re saying you don&#8217;t think NSA is reading our PGP-encrypted mail yet?</p>
<p>What&#8217;s the company with all the IP?</p>
<p>SHG,</p>
<p>Ah, yes. Paree. I remember it well.</p>
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		<title>By: shg</title>
		<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/comment-page-1#comment-931</link>
		<dc:creator>shg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 10:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/?p=481#comment-931</guid>
		<description>I believe you were in gay Paree when this was first posted:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;http://blog.simplejustice.us/2007/12/15/subpoena-quashed-for-encryption-password.aspx</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I believe you were in gay Paree when this was first posted:</p>
<p><a href="http://blog.simplejustice.us/2007/12/15/subpoena-quashed-for-encryption-password.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://blog.simplejustice.us/2007/12/15/subpoena-quashed-for-encryption-password.aspx</a></p>
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		<title>By: methylamine</title>
		<link>http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2008/01/you-can-always-say-no.html/comment-page-1#comment-929</link>
		<dc:creator>methylamine</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 05:13:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://bennettandbennett.com/blog/?p=481#comment-929</guid>
		<description>Hi Mark, Michael here...&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Don&#039;t be too worried about the quantum computer end-run around RSA encryption.  As you know RSA is based on the extreme difficulty of factoring very large numbers which have only two factors, both themselves very large prime numbers.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;There&#039;s an algorithm for using quantum computing on this problem--Shor&#039;s algorithm--and given we can do 4-bit quantum now, it&#039;s a matter of engineering not theory to get further.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;BUT:  There&#039;s a whole different set of computationally hard problems not yet tackled by a quantum algorithm called &quot;Elliptical Curve Cryptography&quot;.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;One bad thing...all meaningful IP for it is tied up on one company making it difficult to do without their licence.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Mark, Michael here&#8230;</p>
<p>Don&#8217;t be too worried about the quantum computer end-run around RSA encryption.  As you know RSA is based on the extreme difficulty of factoring very large numbers which have only two factors, both themselves very large prime numbers.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s an algorithm for using quantum computing on this problem&#8211;Shor&#8217;s algorithm&#8211;and given we can do 4-bit quantum now, it&#8217;s a matter of engineering not theory to get further.</p>
<p>BUT:  There&#8217;s a whole different set of computationally hard problems not yet tackled by a quantum algorithm called &#8220;Elliptical Curve Cryptography&#8221;.</p>
<p>One bad thing&#8230;all meaningful IP for it is tied up on one company making it difficult to do without their licence.</p>
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